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SAFARIS UNLIMITED, LLC, a 
Georgia Limited Liability Company, 
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vs. 
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______________ ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District for Twin Falls County. 
Honorable Randy J. Stoker, District Judge, presiding 
Jeffrey E. Rolig 
JEFFREY E. ROLIG, P.C. 
195 River Vista Pl., Ste. 306 
P.O. Box 5455 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
Attorney for Appellant 
David W. Gadd 
WORST, FITZGERALD & STOVER, PLLC 
905 Shoshone ST. N. 
P.O. Box 1428 
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(3) Statement of the Case. (i) Nature of the case. Respondent Safaris 
Unlimited, LLC, ("Safaris Unlimited" herein) filed suit seeking to recover judgment for the 
amount it alleged was due and owing to it for a safari in which appellant ("Jones" herein) 
participated in 2012. Jones contends the hunt was provided by another company, HHK 
Safaris (Pvt) Ltd. ("HHK" herein) The 2012 hunt was arranged by Jones directly with HHK 
and was conducted by HHK. Jones denied having any contractual relationship with 
Safaris Unlimited for the 2012 hunt. He asserts that his agreement was with HHK and that 
Safaris Unlimited was acting as an unlicensed collection agent for HHK. Jones further 
asserts substantial offsets against the bill for the 2012 hunt with HHK to which he is 
entitled, by reason of a hunt in 2010 with HHK and failure to receive elephant tusks and 
other trophies from the 2012 hunt. 
(ii) Course of Proceedings Below. Safaris Unlimited filed suit on 
June 28, 2013. Jones appeared through counsel, and an Answer was filed on January 6, 
2014. After certain discovery was done, Safaris Unlimited filed its motion for summary 
judgment on July 14, 2014, with various affidavits. Jones responded to the motion with an 
affidavit of counsel, providing various interrogatory answers and deposition testimony of 
Jones. 
A hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held on September 2, 
2014, at which time the Court ruled that he would grant the motion. Judgment in favor of 
Safaris Unlimited was entered on September 3, 2014 for the sum of $31,476.30. (R p. 
155) A notice of appeal was timely filed by Jones on October 9, 2014, (R p. 157) and an 
amended notice of appeal was filed on October 28, 2014. (R p. 163) An amended 
judgment was entered on October 27, 2014, for the sum of $52,005.37. R p. 161) 
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(iii) Statement of Facts. 
Jones went on three hunts with HHK Safaris, in 2010, 2011, and 2012. (R p. 
115--Jones deposition p. 41, II. 16-24.) For the 2010 hunt, Jones bought a hunt auctioned 
at a Safaris Club International convention. The safari company was advertised as HHK 
Safaris, and he contacted Graham Hingston directly. (R p. 117--Jones depo. p. 42, II. 2-
20.) Hingston is in charge of HHK. He runs everything. He can hire, fire, anything. He is 
the man that is in charge of that 100 percent. He's the head dog, the head honcho. ( R p. 
117--Jones depo. p. 44, 11.1-14.) 
The record reflects that in the Fall of 2011, Jones had email correspondence 
with Jennifer Ryan (jenn@hhksafaris.com) concerning setting up a hunt in 2011. He also 
corresponded with her and Graham Hingston (graham@hhksafaris.com) concerning the 
underweight and still undelivered elephant tusks and trophies from the 2010 hunt. (R pp. 
144-148) 
Jones denied having any contact whatsoever with Safaris Unlimited with 
regard to the 2012 hunt in question. (R p. 112--Jones deposition pg. 28). Jones did have 
some contact with Safaris Unlimited in the two previous hunts he had, which was different 
than this one. (R p. 112--Jones depo. pg. 29, LL. 20-25.) On this hunt, Jones did 
everything with Graham [Hingston] personally. (R p. 113--Jones depo. pg. 30, II. 1-2, II. 9-
19; pg. 38, II. 15-23.) Jones first spoke with Graham at the SCI convention in late January 
or early February of 2012, probably in Las Vegas. The hunt was to be with HHK Safaris, 
as that is the name that was on the booth. (R p. 126--Jones depo. p. 89, II. 1-25.) Jones 
further testified that he "had no dealings with Safaris Unlimited on the 2012 hunt, other 
than they sent me a bill," after he got back. (R p. 114--Jones depo., pg. 32, II. 18-24.) 
The Declaration of Derek Adams submitted in support of Respondent's 
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motion for summary judgment states in part that, (1) He was the professional hunter that 
assisted Jones on the 2012 hunt; and (2) 'The accommodations and big game hunting 
services that Jones received from November 22, 2012, to December 1, 2012, were 
provided by employees of HHK, including myself, in accordance with HHK's agreement 
with Safaris Unlimited, LLC." (R p. 46) Page 5 of Exhibit "B" to Adams' Declaration is a 
Liability Release, under the letterhead of HHK Safaris, between Jones and HHK Safaris. 
(R p. 54) Page 6 of that Exhibit "B" is a "Client's File" for Jones, again under the letterhead 
of HHK Safaris. Exhibit "A" to Adams' Declaration is an Invoice which respondent asserts 
is an agreement by Jones to pay respondent for the 2012 hunt. (R p. 49) Jones denied he 
signed it; but in any event, that document is nothing more than a price list for animals 
taken during the hunt. 
The Declaration of Jennifer Ryan contains an email from her to Jones, again 
sent from jenn@hhksafaris.com, stating, "It is now the end of January and 60 days since 
you finished your safari with HHK." (R p. 92) 
The 2010 hunt with HHK was problematic. Jones went on the hunt in Africa 
to take a trophy elephant, which is classified as over 30 pounds on the weight of the tusks. 
(R 117--Jones depo. p 45, I. 23 to p. 46, I. 3.) The trophy fee would be $12,000 or 
$13,000. (R 117--Jones depo. p. 46, I. 3.) Jones shot an elephant at the instruction of the 
professional hunter, who said it weighed about 35 pounds. Subsequently, it turned out 
that the animal was a 20-pounder, which Jones could have hunted on that same hunt for a 
$3,000 fee. (R 117--Jones depo. p. 46, I. 4 top. 47, I. 18.) 
In addition, Jones did not get any of the trophies from the hunt, which would 
be skins from a buffalo, an eland, another animal or two, which will be ruined by now 
because they have not been properly cared for at a taxidermy place. (R 119--Jones depo. 
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p. 47, I. 19 top. 48, I. 9.) Jones' verified Interrogatory Answers further set out his right to 
offsets against the bill being asserted for 2012: 
(2) There are substantial offsets to the HHK bill being advanced 
by plaintiff that defendant is entitled to claim. In 2010, defendant went on a 
safari with HHK. He paid $30,000 for the hunt, which included a $12,000 fee 
for a trophy elephant. Defendant did shoot an elephant, on the advice of the 
guide, who told defendant it was a "35 pound" animal; i.e., 35 pounds per 
ivory tusk. However, the tusks turned out to be only 26 and 28 lbs., which is 
far short of a trophy animal. The fee for a nontrophy elephant was $3,500. 
Defendant is entitled to an offset for the difference. In addition, defendant 
never received the tusks, which would be worth $400 per lb. for the ivory 
(over $16,000 total). Also on that hunt, he shot a buffalo, which should have 
been delivered to Taxidermy Enterprises. He is entitled to a substantial 
offset for those animals, which he did not receive. 
(3) On the 2012 hunt, defendant shot a trophy elephant (45 lb. 
tusks), a tuskless elephant, and a buffalo. He has not received any of those 
animals. The ivory alone would be worth at least $36,000. The camp for the 
2012 hunt was scheduled for 10 days. Unfortunately, contrary to what had 
been agreed, defendant was forced to share the camp with nine South 
Africans, who were extremely noisy, drunk and overbearing most of the time. 
The South Africans consumed all the food and drank all the Cokes and other 
drinks. The camp also ran out of diesel fuel. Defendant left the site early. 
(R p. 135) 
Appellant further contends that Safaris Unlimited is acting as a collection 
agency in this matter. Jones testified: 
"Q. . .. What evidence do you have to support that statement, 
that Plaintiff is actins as a collection? 
A. They filed a lawsuit without standing. 
Q. Okay. Well, standing is a legal issue. I'm asking what facts 
you have. 
A. The fact I have is that they're not licensed in Idaho as a 
collection agency. And I don't believe they're licensed in Georgia as a 
collection agency either. 
Q. Are they a collection agency? 
A. That's what they're doing here. And under what I feel 
happened, yes, they are a collection agency. 
Q. What facts do you have to support that assertion that they 
are a collection agency? 
A. They're collecting for a third party." 
(R p. 116--Jones depo. p. 39, I. 9-24.) 
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The Declaration of Jennifer Ryan purports to show that one C. Martin 
Wood, Ill is the owner of Safaris Unlimited, LLC, and that Wood is an owner of 
Bulawayo Trading Company (Pvt) Limited ("Bulawayo"), which in turn is a part owner of 
HHK Safaris. However, the documents do not show that Wood is a member of Safaris 
Unlimited, LLC. (R pp. 56, 61-69) 
(4) Issues Presented on Appeal. (1) The trial court erred in granting 
Respondent's motion for summary judgment. 
(2) The trial court erred in (a) holding that there was no triable issue of 
fact; (b) holding that Respondent was the correct party in interest to bring the suit; (c) 
not holding that Respondent was acting as an unlicensed collection agency; (d) not 
recognizing that Appellant has properly pied viable offsets to the account on which the 
lawsuit is based. 
(3) Appellant claims attorney fees on appeal, pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 12-120(3) and Rule 54(e), I.R.C.P., because the present action involves a 
contract for services and a commercial transaction. Rule 54(e)(1 ), I.R.C.P. provides: 
Rule 54(e)(1 ). Attorney fees In any civil action the court may award 
reasonable attorney fees, which at the discretion of the court may include 
paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 
54(d)(1 )(B), when provided for by any statute or contract. 
Idaho Code Sec. 12-120(3) reads in pertinent part: 
§ 12-120. ATTORNEY'S FEES IN CIVIL ACTIONS 
(3)In any civil action to recover on an ... account stated, ... or contract 
relating to the purchase or sale of . . . services and in any commercial 
transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be 
allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and 
collected as costs . 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions 
except transactions for personal or household purposes. 
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Appellant should be held to be the prevailing party on this appeal because the amended 
judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
(5) Argument. 
1. Standard of Review. The standard of review in an appeal from 
entry of summary judgment was stated in AED, Inc. v. KDC Investments, LLC, 155 
Idaho 159, 307 P.3d 176, 180 (Idaho 2013) 
This Court exercises de nova review of a grant of summary judgment and 
the " standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court 
in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Stonebrook Const., LLC v. 
Chase Home Fin., LLC, 152 Idaho 927, 929, 277 P.3d 374, 376 (2012) 
(quoting Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394, 224 
P.3d 458, 461 (2008)). Summary judgment is proper if " the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
When applying this standard, this Court construes disputed facts" in favor 
of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Curlee, 148 
Idaho at 394, 224 P.3d at 461. Where " the evidence reveals no disputed 
issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains, over which 
this Court exercises free review." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State 
Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006) (citing 
lnfanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 44 P.3d 1100 (2002)). However, 
to survive summary judgment, " an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 
56(c). Therefore, " the nonmoving party must submit more than just 
conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists .... " Jenkins v. 
Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 238, 108 P.3d 380, 385 (2005) 
(citing Northwest Bee-Corp. v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 839, 41 
P.3d 263, 267 (2002)). " A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt 
as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for 
the purposes of summary judgment." ld.307 P.3d 176, 155 Idaho 159 
(Idaho 2013) 
2. Jones Entered Into a Contract with HHK Safaris For the 2012 Hunt. 
The record is undisputed that Jones entered into an agreement for the 
2012 hunt with HHK Safaris. Jones did not contract with respondent for the hunt. 
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Respondent did not dispute that fact at the trial court. In fact, the declaration of Graham 
Hingston appears to confirm Jones' explanation of how an agreement was formed 
between Jones and HHK. Instead, respondent argued that it has the right to collect 
what might be owed for the hunt due to an Invoice it prepared. Regardless of whether 
or not respondent may seek to collect for the HHK hunt, the contract was between 
Jones and HHK. 
The Invoice that is attached as Exhibit "A" to the declaration of Derek 
Adams is not an agreement to pay money to Safaris Unlimited, LLC. It is simply an 
acknowledgement of the animals that were taken during the hunt and the price for each. 
Nothing in the record even arguably shows any agreement by Jones that he contracted 
for respondent to provide the 2012 hunt to him, or that he was obligated to pay 
respondent for the 2012 hunt. Respondent may have rightly or wrongly been acting as 
a billing agent for HHK, but Jones' contract was with HHK, not respondent. 
Respondent relies upon the case of Sirius LC v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, 
42, 156 P.3d 539 (2007) for the proposition that the consideration supplied by HHK 
would support respondent's claim on its "Invoice." However, the case does not support 
respondent's position. In Sirius, the plaintiff was the owner of a promissory note on 
which he filed suit. The Court ruled that the note could be enforced as a common law 
contract, supported by consideration supplied by another party. In the case at bar, 
there simply is no contract between respondent and Jones upon which it can sue. The 
Invoice upon which respondent purports to sue is just that. It is not a contract. The 
contract was between Jones and HHK. 
3. The Issue of Off Sets Against the 2012 Bill Was Properly Raised by 
Jones. Given the fact that the safari contract was with HHK, Jones had the right 
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to claim offsets to the amount claimed for that contract. In his Answer, Jones 
affirmatively alleged that plaintiff was not the real party in interest and that he had no 
contractual relationship with respondent. (Answer, p. 2.) Jones further affirmatively 
alleged that he has not received the tusks and trophies from the 2012 hunt. He further 
raised the issue of tusks and trophies from a 2010 hunt with HHK that he had not 
received. All of these items were alleged to have a value far in excess of the bill for the 
2012 hunt. 
For the 2010 hunt, he paid a $12,000 fee for a trophy elephant, but the 
elephant that the guide told him to shoot was not trophy-size, so the fee for that animal 
should have been $3,000, a difference of $9,000. Also, the ivory having a value of 
$16,000 was never delivered to him or his agent. Further, he and his agent did not 
receive other trophies that he shot. Jones instructed HHK to deliver the items to 
Taxidermy Enterprises in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. Jones explained that HHK simply 
drops those items off at the taxidermy shop. It would be Jones' responsibility to ship 
them to the U.S., but they never made it to the taxidermy shop. (Jones depo., p 47, I. 
14 top. 49 I. 15.) With regard to the 2012 hunt, he or his agent have not received the 
ivory from the elephant he took, at a loss of another $36,000. (Rolig Aff., Exh. "B," p. 2.) 
The trial court erroneously ruled that these items had to be the subject of a 
counterclaim and not an offset as raised in Jones' affirmative defenses. Rule 8(c), 
I.R.C.P., states in pertinent part: 
Rule 8(c). Affirmative defenses. 
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... 
any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When 
a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a 
counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall 
treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation. 
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Because Jones was seeking an offset against the bill, it was not 
necessary to designate these items as a counterclaim. Simply put, the bill should be 
reduced to zero. This should not require the filing of a counterclaim. 
Furthermore, the offsets for 2010 and 2012 are due to the actions of HHK 
Safaris, the party with whom Jones contracted. Appellant respectfully asserts that these 
issues were properly raised, both in pleadings and subsequent discovery, which clearly 
set out Jones' position. 
4. Plaintiff is Acting as a Collection Agent by Trying to Collect For the 
HHK Safari. Idaho law provides: 
§ 26-2223. COLLECTION AGENCY, DEBT COUNSELOR, CREDIT 
COUNSELOR, OR CREDIT REPAIR ORGANIZATION - LICENSE 
REQUIRED No person shall without complying with the terms of this act and 
obtaining a license from the director: 
(1)Operate as a collection agency, debt counselor, credit counselor, or credit 
repair organization in this state. 
(2)Engage, either directly or indirectly, in this state in the business of 
collecting or receiving payment for others of any account, bill, claim or other 
indebtedness. 
A "collection agency" means a person who engages in any of the activities 
enumerated in subsections (2) through (6) of section 26-2223. Idaho Code section 26-
2222(4 ). To avoid the impact of this statute, plaintiff relies upon I.C. section 26-2239(10), 
which exempts: "Any person while acting as a debt collector for another person, both of 
whom are related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if the person 
acting as a debt collector does so only for persons to whom he is so related or affiliated 
and if the principal business of such person is not the collection of debts." 
The affidavit of Louis Spiker contains a letter from the Idaho Department of 
Finance. The letter does not say that the Department finds that respondent is not a 
collection agency. It simply states, "The Department has made the decision to pursue no 
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further information related to the complaint, and, at this time, is closing its file on this 
matter." That is not a ruling by the Department that respondent's actions are proper. It is 
simply taking a 'wait and see' attitude on the matter. 
Jones submits that the common ownership requirement of the statute is not 
met. Respondent did not provide anything to show that C. Martin Wood is a member of 
Safaris Unlimited LLC, even though he may have been the organizer. Furthermore, the 
documentation submitted by respondent (See Exhibits A, B and C to Declaration of 
Jennifer Ryan) shows that Wood is not an owner of HHK Safaris, and HHK Safaris is not a 
member of Safaris Unlimited. If, as respondent purported to show, Wood is an owner in 
Bulawayo Trading Company (Pvt) Limited, which appears to be an owner of HHK Safaris, 
that is not the "common ownership" that is contemplated by the statute. Accordingly, 
respondent is acting contrary to law by collecting this debt for HHK, and the trial court 
should have ruled that respondent's claim is barred. 
5. Conclusion. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed 
and the case should be remanded for further proceedings. (1) The offsets raised in 
appellant's affirmative defenses and explained in his deposition testimony and 
Interrogatory Answers should have been allowed to proceed to trial. (2) Regardless of 
whether respondent could bring this action on HHK's behalf, HHK was the contracting 
party with appellant. Claims which appellant has against HHK are legitimate offsets 
against the 2012 billing. (3) Related to number (2), any amount that may be owed for 
the 2012 hunt is not owed to respondent, and judgment in respondent's favor was not 
proper. (4) Respondent is acting as an unlicensed collection and should not have been 
allowed to bring this action. 
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DATED this day of February, 2015. 
JEFFREY E. ROLIG, P.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17 day of February, 2015, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be served upon the following 
person in the following manner: 
David W. Gadd 
Worst, Fitzgerald 
P.O. Box 1428 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1428 
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